Highly Restricted
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Global commercial connectivity coexists with service blocking, criminal speech controls, pervasive surveillance, and no independent political remedy.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
United Arab Emirates: The government filters political and social content, closely controls domestic media, and funds coordinated online promotion, while many commercial global services remain available.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 3/4; social-media shutdown estimate 2/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
United Arab Emirates's B1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
United Arab Emirates: The government filters political and social content, closely controls domestic media, and funds coordinated online promotion, while many commercial global services remain available.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 1/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 0/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][2]
United Arab Emirates's B2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: The government filters political and social content, closely controls domestic media, and funds coordinated online promotion, while many commercial global services remain available.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 1/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 2/4; online-speech legal protection 0/4. [2][1][3]
United Arab Emirates's B3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
United Arab Emirates: The government filters political and social content, closely controls domestic media, and funds coordinated online promotion, while many commercial global services remain available.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 0/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 0/4. [2][1][3]
United Arab Emirates's B4 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: The government filters political and social content, closely controls domestic media, and funds coordinated online promotion, while many commercial global services remain available.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 0/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][2]
United Arab Emirates's B5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
United Arab Emirates: Courts upheld 15-year sentences against five human-rights defenders for online writing, and a critic extradited from Lebanon remained forcibly disappeared.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 0/4; WJP's effective-expression measure 1.2/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 28/100. [1][7][5][8]
United Arab Emirates's C1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Courts upheld 15-year sentences against five human-rights defenders for online writing, and a critic extradited from Lebanon remained forcibly disappeared.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 0/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 0/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
United Arab Emirates's C2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
United Arab Emirates: Courts upheld 15-year sentences against five human-rights defenders for online writing, and a critic extradited from Lebanon remained forcibly disappeared.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 0/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 1/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
United Arab Emirates's C3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Courts upheld 15-year sentences against five human-rights defenders for online writing, and a critic extradited from Lebanon remained forcibly disappeared.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 2/5 and technical attacks 2/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 30.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
United Arab Emirates's C4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Courts upheld 15-year sentences against five human-rights defenders for online writing, and a critic extradited from Lebanon remained forcibly disappeared.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 1/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 0/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 0/4; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.2/4. [2][1][5][8]
United Arab Emirates's C5 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
United Arab Emirates: Sophisticated surveillance, identity exposure, and broad security powers operate with little disclosure or independent authorization, creating acute risk for critics and migrant communities.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 0/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 1/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 1/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 1.1/4. [6][1][2][7]
United Arab Emirates's D1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
United Arab Emirates: Sophisticated surveillance, identity exposure, and broad security powers operate with little disclosure or independent authorization, creating acute risk for critics and migrant communities.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 0/6 and privacy protection 0/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 1/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 1.1/4. [1][7][2]
United Arab Emirates's D2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
United Arab Emirates: Sophisticated surveillance, identity exposure, and broad security powers operate with little disclosure or independent authorization, creating acute risk for critics and migrant communities.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4 and state surveillance constraints 0/6; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 1/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
United Arab Emirates's D3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
United Arab Emirates: Sophisticated surveillance, identity exposure, and broad security powers operate with little disclosure or independent authorization, creating acute risk for critics and migrant communities.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 0/6 and technical attacks 2/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 1/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 30.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
United Arab Emirates's D4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Sophisticated surveillance, identity exposure, and broad security powers operate with little disclosure or independent authorization, creating acute risk for critics and migrant communities.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 0/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
United Arab Emirates's D5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
United Arab Emirates: Summary trials, torture allegations, enforced disappearance, and executive influence over courts and security institutions leave no dependable independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; WJP's judicial-constraint measure 2.3/4; administrative due-process measure 2.6/4; civil-justice independence measure 2.4/4. [7][1]
United Arab Emirates's E1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Summary trials, torture allegations, enforced disappearance, and executive influence over courts and security institutions leave no dependable independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6 and privacy protection 0/6; WJP's independent-review measure 3.1/4; regulatory independence measure 3.4/4. [7][1]
United Arab Emirates's E2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Summary trials, torture allegations, enforced disappearance, and executive influence over courts and security institutions leave no dependable independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and privacy protection 0/6; WJP's publicized-laws measure 1.5/4; right-to-information measure 1.2/4. [7][1]
United Arab Emirates's E3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
United Arab Emirates: Summary trials, torture allegations, enforced disappearance, and executive influence over courts and security institutions leave no dependable independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; WJP's complaint-mechanisms measure 1.6/4; civil-justice access measure 2.5/4; civil-justice enforcement measure 2.7/4. [7][1]
United Arab Emirates's E4 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
United Arab Emirates: Summary trials, torture allegations, enforced disappearance, and executive influence over courts and security institutions leave no dependable independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 1/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.2/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 0/4. [2][1][7]
United Arab Emirates's E5 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
[2][3][4]Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04United Arab Emirates, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.