Highly Restricted
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Assessment windowJanuary 1–December 31, 2025
Research cutoffJuly 17, 2026
FrameworkMethodology v0.3 · 20 indicators
Territory coverageSudan during nationwide armed conflict
Finding
01Why Sudan received this score.
Wartime shutdowns, infrastructure attacks, severe violence, surveillance, repression by belligerents, and collapsed remedies leave almost no dependable online freedom.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
Free Expression & Civic Space
Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
Rule of Law & Accountability
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
Standard coverage
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Indicator scores.
Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
B
30% weight
Open Internet & Content Controls
Centralized controls sustain nationwide filtering of political information, platforms, or circumvention tools.
27.58.3 / 30 points
B1Shutdowns and throttling0.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have repeatedly disrupted communications, controlled network access in areas they hold, and used connectivity restrictions as part of the war.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 1/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 0/4; social-media shutdown estimate 0/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's B1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
B2Website and service blocking1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have repeatedly disrupted communications, controlled network access in areas they hold, and used connectivity restrictions as part of the war.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 5/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 1/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][4]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's B2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B3Removal and filtering orders1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have repeatedly disrupted communications, controlled network access in areas they hold, and used connectivity restrictions as part of the war.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 2/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 2/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 2/4; online-speech legal protection 1/4. [2][1][3][4]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's B3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B4Intermediary liability1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have repeatedly disrupted communications, controlled network access in areas they hold, and used connectivity restrictions as part of the war.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 2/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 1/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 2/4. [2][1][3][4]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's B4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B5Circumvention and cross-border access1.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces have repeatedly disrupted communications, controlled network access in areas they hold, and used connectivity restrictions as part of the war.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 1/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 3/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][4]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's B5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
C
30% weight
Free Expression & Civic Space
Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
37.511.3 / 30 points
C1Legal protection for expression1.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Journalists and online civic voices face detention, threats, killings, and forced displacement from both belligerents, leaving little space for safe independent reporting.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 1/4; WJP's effective-expression measure 1.5/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 27/100. [1][7][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's C1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
C2Speech-related offenses1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Journalists and online civic voices face detention, threats, killings, and forced displacement from both belligerents, leaving little space for safe independent reporting.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 1/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 2/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's C2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C3Arrests and penalties1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Journalists and online civic voices face detention, threats, killings, and forced displacement from both belligerents, leaving little space for safe independent reporting.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 2/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 1/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's C3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C4Harassment, violence, and digital attacks1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Journalists and online civic voices face detention, threats, killings, and forced displacement from both belligerents, leaving little space for safe independent reporting.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 0/5 and technical attacks 1/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 29.0/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's C4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C5Civic participation and pluralism2.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Journalists and online civic voices face detention, threats, killings, and forced displacement from both belligerents, leaving little space for safe independent reporting.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 2/4 and digital civic mobilization 2/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 2/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.8/4. [2][1][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's C5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
D
20% weight
Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
35.07.0 / 20 points
D1Data protection rights1.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Armed control of telecommunications, device searches, and the absence of independent authorization or data-protection enforcement leave private political communication highly exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 0/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 0/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 2/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 0.6/4. [6][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's D1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
D2Surveillance law and authorization1.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Armed control of telecommunications, device searches, and the absence of independent authorization or data-protection enforcement leave private political communication highly exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 1/6 and privacy protection 0/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 1/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 0.6/4. [1][7][2]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's D2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
D3Retention, access, and identity mandates1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Armed control of telecommunications, device searches, and the absence of independent authorization or data-protection enforcement leave private political communication highly exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 3/4 and state surveillance constraints 1/6; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 2/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's D3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
D4Targeted surveillance and spyware1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Armed control of telecommunications, device searches, and the absence of independent authorization or data-protection enforcement leave private political communication highly exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 1/6 and technical attacks 1/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 1/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 29.0/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's D4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
D5Encryption and anonymity2.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: Armed control of telecommunications, device searches, and the absence of independent authorization or data-protection enforcement leave private political communication highly exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 3/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's D5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
E
20% weight
Rule of Law & Accountability
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
20.04.0 / 20 points
E1Judicial independence and due process0.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The civil war has displaced national institutions and eliminated dependable nationwide judicial, regulatory, or administrative remedies for censorship and surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; WJP's judicial-constraint measure 1.0/4; administrative due-process measure 0.5/4; civil-justice independence measure 1.1/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's E1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
E2Independent regulators0.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The civil war has displaced national institutions and eliminated dependable nationwide judicial, regulatory, or administrative remedies for censorship and surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6 and privacy protection 0/6; WJP's independent-review measure 0.7/4; regulatory independence measure 2.1/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's E2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
E3Government transparency0.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The civil war has displaced national institutions and eliminated dependable nationwide judicial, regulatory, or administrative remedies for censorship and surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 2/4 and privacy protection 0/6; WJP's publicized-laws measure 0.9/4; right-to-information measure 0.9/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's E3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
E4Notice, appeal, and remedy1.0 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The civil war has displaced national institutions and eliminated dependable nationwide judicial, regulatory, or administrative remedies for censorship and surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 2/4 and legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; WJP's complaint-mechanisms measure 1.7/4; civil-justice access measure 1.3/4; civil-justice enforcement measure 2.0/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's E4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
E5Open and multistakeholder policymaking1.5 / 4
Observed record
Sudan: The civil war has displaced national institutions and eliminated dependable nationwide judicial, regulatory, or administrative remedies for censorship and surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 2/4 and digital civic mobilization 2/6; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.8/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4. [2][1][7]
Scoring judgment
Sudan's E5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Country findings
03Findings by pillar.
These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Open Internet & Content Controls
Centralized controls sustain nationwide filtering of political information, platforms, or circumvention tools.
[2][3][4]Free Expression & Civic Space
Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
[2][5][8]Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Rule of Law & Accountability
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04Coverage
Sudan during nationwide armed conflict, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Evidence
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Scoring
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Sources used for this report.
Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.
- 01Freedom HouseSudan: Freedom on the Net 2025 country report ↗Civil society · 2025 edition
- 02Digital Society ProjectDigital Society Project Dataset v8 ↗Independent measurement · 2000–2025 country-year data
- 03Open Observatory of Network InterferenceSudan measurement dashboard ↗Independent measurement · Accessed July 17, 2026
- 04Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalitionInternet Shutdowns in 2025 Annual Report ↗Civil society · March 2026
- 05Committee to Protect Journalists2025 journalist prison census and case database ↗Civil society · January 21, 2026
- 06UN Trade and DevelopmentData protection and privacy legislation worldwide ↗International organization · Accessed July 17, 2026
- 07World Justice ProjectRule of Law Index 2025 ↗Independent measurement · October 28, 2025
- 08Reporters Without BordersSudan: World Press Freedom Index 2026 profile ↗Civil society · May 2026