Closed
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Connectivity disruption, violent repression, surveillance concerns, conflict, and extremely weak institutions leave only narrow space for protected online activity.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
South Sudan: Major services are intermittently available, but authorities retain blocking powers and users face a fragile communications environment shaped by political and armed conflict.; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 1/4; social-media shutdown estimate 1/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
South Sudan's B1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
South Sudan: Major services are intermittently available, but authorities retain blocking powers and users face a fragile communications environment shaped by political and armed conflict.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and private discussion 0/4; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 1/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][4]
South Sudan's B2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: Major services are intermittently available, but authorities retain blocking powers and users face a fragile communications environment shaped by political and armed conflict.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and private discussion 0/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 1/4; online-speech legal protection 1/4. [2][1][3][4]
South Sudan's B3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: Major services are intermittently available, but authorities retain blocking powers and users face a fragile communications environment shaped by political and armed conflict.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 1/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 2/4. [2][1][3][4]
South Sudan's B4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
South Sudan: Major services are intermittently available, but authorities retain blocking powers and users face a fragile communications environment shaped by political and armed conflict.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and private discussion 0/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][4]
South Sudan's B5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
South Sudan: Security authorities have detained journalists and civic organizers, including photographer Abraham Aleu Anyieth, while threats forced civil-society organizer Bol Deng Bol to flee.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and private discussion 0/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 1/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 0/100. [1][7][5][8]
South Sudan's C1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: Security authorities have detained journalists and civic organizers, including photographer Abraham Aleu Anyieth, while threats forced civil-society organizer Bol Deng Bol to flee.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and due process 0/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 2/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
South Sudan's C2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: Security authorities have detained journalists and civic organizers, including photographer Abraham Aleu Anyieth, while threats forced civil-society organizer Bol Deng Bol to flee.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded due process 0/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 0/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
South Sudan's C3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: Security authorities have detained journalists and civic organizers, including photographer Abraham Aleu Anyieth, while threats forced civil-society organizer Bol Deng Bol to flee.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 46.2/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
South Sudan's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
South Sudan: Security authorities have detained journalists and civic organizers, including photographer Abraham Aleu Anyieth, while threats forced civil-society organizer Bol Deng Bol to flee.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded political choice free from domination 0/4 and assembly freedom 1/4; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 1/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 1/4. [2][1][5][8]
South Sudan's C5 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
South Sudan: The amended National Security Service Act retained warrantless arrest authority, and communications monitoring operates without a dependable independent authorization and disclosure system.; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 0/1. [6][1][2][7]
South Sudan's D1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: The amended National Security Service Act retained warrantless arrest authority, and communications monitoring operates without a dependable independent authorization and disclosure system.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 0/4 and due process 0/4; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 0/4. [1][7][2]
South Sudan's D2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: The amended National Security Service Act retained warrantless arrest authority, and communications monitoring operates without a dependable independent authorization and disclosure system.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded private discussion 0/4 and due process 0/4; protection from political monitoring 0/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
South Sudan's D3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: The amended National Security Service Act retained warrantless arrest authority, and communications monitoring operates without a dependable independent authorization and disclosure system.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 0/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; DSP's protection from political monitoring 0/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 46.2/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
South Sudan's D4 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: The amended National Security Service Act retained warrantless arrest authority, and communications monitoring operates without a dependable independent authorization and disclosure system.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded private discussion 0/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; protection from political monitoring 0/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
South Sudan's D5 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
South Sudan: Repeated election delays, executive security powers, weak courts, and conflict conditions leave almost no effective remedy for online censorship, detention, or surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 0/4 and due process 0/4. [7][1]
South Sudan's E1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
South Sudan: Repeated election delays, executive security powers, weak courts, and conflict conditions leave almost no effective remedy for online censorship, detention, or surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded government safeguards against corruption 0/4 and government openness and transparency 0/4. [7][1]
South Sudan's E2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
South Sudan: Repeated election delays, executive security powers, weak courts, and conflict conditions leave almost no effective remedy for online censorship, detention, or surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded government openness and transparency 0/4. [7][1]
South Sudan's E3 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
South Sudan: Repeated election delays, executive security powers, weak courts, and conflict conditions leave almost no effective remedy for online censorship, detention, or surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 0/4 and due process 0/4. [7][1]
South Sudan's E4 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
South Sudan: Repeated election delays, executive security powers, weak courts, and conflict conditions leave almost no effective remedy for online censorship, detention, or surveillance.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded elected officials' authority 0/4 and assembly freedom 1/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 1/4. [2][1][7]
South Sudan's E5 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
[2][3][4]Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04South Sudan, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.