Closed
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Selective access to global services coexists with severe punishment of online dissent, extensive surveillance, and no independent political remedy.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
Saudi Arabia: Authorities maintain extensive political and social filtering, compelled removal, and strong state influence over platforms and media, although some global services remain accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 2/4; social-media shutdown estimate 3/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Saudi Arabia's B1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Saudi Arabia: Authorities maintain extensive political and social filtering, compelled removal, and strong state influence over platforms and media, although some global services remain accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 1/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 0/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][2]
Saudi Arabia's B2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Saudi Arabia: Authorities maintain extensive political and social filtering, compelled removal, and strong state influence over platforms and media, although some global services remain accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 1/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 2/4; online-speech legal protection 0/4. [2][1][3]
Saudi Arabia's B3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Authorities maintain extensive political and social filtering, compelled removal, and strong state influence over platforms and media, although some global services remain accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 0/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 1/4. [2][1][3]
Saudi Arabia's B4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Authorities maintain extensive political and social filtering, compelled removal, and strong state influence over platforms and media, although some global services remain accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 0/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][2]
Saudi Arabia's B5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
Saudi Arabia: Peaceful online expression can result in decades-long prison terms; recent cases included a 10-year sentence for a deleted post and a secret 23-year sentence for political cartoons.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 0/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 25/100. [1][7][5][8]
Saudi Arabia's C1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Saudi Arabia: Peaceful online expression can result in decades-long prison terms; recent cases included a 10-year sentence for a deleted post and a secret 23-year sentence for political cartoons.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 0/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 1/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Saudi Arabia's C2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Saudi Arabia: Peaceful online expression can result in decades-long prison terms; recent cases included a 10-year sentence for a deleted post and a secret 23-year sentence for political cartoons.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 0/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 0/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Saudi Arabia's C3 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Saudi Arabia: Peaceful online expression can result in decades-long prison terms; recent cases included a 10-year sentence for a deleted post and a secret 23-year sentence for political cartoons.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 1/5 and technical attacks 2/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 19.1/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Saudi Arabia's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Peaceful online expression can result in decades-long prison terms; recent cases included a 10-year sentence for a deleted post and a secret 23-year sentence for political cartoons.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 1/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 0/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 1/4. [2][1][5][8]
Saudi Arabia's C5 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Saudi Arabia: Pervasive surveillance, identity exposure, and opaque security powers leave little practical privacy or anonymity for political users despite formal data rules and available encryption.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 1/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 0/1. [6][1][2][7]
Saudi Arabia's D1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Pervasive surveillance, identity exposure, and opaque security powers leave little practical privacy or anonymity for political users despite formal data rules and available encryption.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 0/6 and privacy protection 1/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 0/4. [1][7][2]
Saudi Arabia's D2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Pervasive surveillance, identity exposure, and opaque security powers leave little practical privacy or anonymity for political users despite formal data rules and available encryption.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4 and state surveillance constraints 0/6; protection from political monitoring 0/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
Saudi Arabia's D3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Pervasive surveillance, identity exposure, and opaque security powers leave little practical privacy or anonymity for political users despite formal data rules and available encryption.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 0/6 and technical attacks 2/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 0/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 19.1/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
Saudi Arabia's D4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Saudi Arabia: Pervasive surveillance, identity exposure, and opaque security powers leave little practical privacy or anonymity for political users despite formal data rules and available encryption.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 0/4; protection from political monitoring 0/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
Saudi Arabia's D5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
Saudi Arabia: Executive control over courts and security institutions and secret national-security proceedings prevent a dependable independent challenge to censorship, monitoring, or speech sentences.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6. [7][1]
Saudi Arabia's E1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Saudi Arabia: Executive control over courts and security institutions and secret national-security proceedings prevent a dependable independent challenge to censorship, monitoring, or speech sentences.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6 and privacy protection 1/6. [7][1]
Saudi Arabia's E2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Saudi Arabia: Executive control over courts and security institutions and secret national-security proceedings prevent a dependable independent challenge to censorship, monitoring, or speech sentences.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and privacy protection 1/6. [7][1]
Saudi Arabia's E3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Saudi Arabia: Executive control over courts and security institutions and secret national-security proceedings prevent a dependable independent challenge to censorship, monitoring, or speech sentences.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and legal protection and judicial independence 0/6. [7][1]
Saudi Arabia's E4 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Saudi Arabia: Executive control over courts and security institutions and secret national-security proceedings prevent a dependable independent challenge to censorship, monitoring, or speech sentences.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 1/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 1/4. [2][1][7]
Saudi Arabia's E5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
[2][3][4]Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04Saudi Arabia, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.