Constrained
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Shutdowns and platform restrictions, violence affecting journalists and protesters, surveillance concerns, conflict, and weak accountability constrain online freedom.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
Mozambique: Authorities restricted connectivity and social platforms during the disputed 2024 election and ensuing protests, while most services remained available outside crisis periods.; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 3/4; social-media shutdown estimate 3/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Mozambique's B1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Mozambique: Authorities restricted connectivity and social platforms during the disputed 2024 election and ensuing protests, while most services remained available outside crisis periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 3/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][4]
Mozambique's B2 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Mozambique: Authorities restricted connectivity and social platforms during the disputed 2024 election and ensuing protests, while most services remained available outside crisis periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 3/4; online-speech legal protection 4/4. [2][1][3][4]
Mozambique's B3 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Mozambique: Authorities restricted connectivity and social platforms during the disputed 2024 election and ensuing protests, while most services remained available outside crisis periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 4/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 2/4. [2][1][3][4]
Mozambique's B4 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Mozambique: Authorities restricted connectivity and social platforms during the disputed 2024 election and ensuing protests, while most services remained available outside crisis periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 3/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 3/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][4]
Mozambique's B5 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
Mozambique: Journalists reporting on corruption, elections, and the Cabo Delgado conflict face threats, attacks, detention, and severe access restrictions.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 4/4; WJP's effective-expression measure 1.5/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 42/100. [1][7][5][8]
Mozambique's C1 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Mozambique: Journalists reporting on corruption, elections, and the Cabo Delgado conflict face threats, attacks, detention, and severe access restrictions.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and due process 2/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 2/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Mozambique's C2 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Mozambique: Journalists reporting on corruption, elections, and the Cabo Delgado conflict face threats, attacks, detention, and severe access restrictions.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded due process 2/4 and equal treatment under law 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 1/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Mozambique's C3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Mozambique: Journalists reporting on corruption, elections, and the Cabo Delgado conflict face threats, attacks, detention, and severe access restrictions.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and equal treatment under law 1/4; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 52.3/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Mozambique's C4 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Mozambique: Journalists reporting on corruption, elections, and the Cabo Delgado conflict face threats, attacks, detention, and severe access restrictions.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded political choice free from domination 1/4 and assembly freedom 0/4; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 3/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 3/4; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.6/4. [2][1][5][8]
Mozambique's C5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Mozambique: Protest monitoring, weak data safeguards, and security operations create material risks for political users despite continued availability of secure communication tools.; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 1/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 4/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 0.8/4. [6][1][2][7]
Mozambique's D1 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Mozambique: Protest monitoring, weak data safeguards, and security operations create material risks for political users despite continued availability of secure communication tools.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 2/4 and due process 2/4; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 3/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 0.8/4. [1][7][2]
Mozambique's D2 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Mozambique: Protest monitoring, weak data safeguards, and security operations create material risks for political users despite continued availability of secure communication tools.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded private discussion 2/4 and due process 2/4; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 4/4; protection from political monitoring 3/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
Mozambique's D3 evidence supports 3.0/4. Protection is generally effective, with recurring but bounded shortcomings.
Mozambique: Protest monitoring, weak data safeguards, and security operations create material risks for political users despite continued availability of secure communication tools.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 2/4 and equal treatment under law 1/4; DSP's protection from political monitoring 3/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 52.3/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
Mozambique's D4 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Mozambique: Protest monitoring, weak data safeguards, and security operations create material risks for political users despite continued availability of secure communication tools.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded private discussion 2/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 3/4; protection from political monitoring 3/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
Mozambique's D5 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
Mozambique: Ruling-party dominance, disputed elections, postelection violence, and weak accountability sharply limit judicial and regulatory remedies.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 2/4 and due process 2/4; WJP's judicial-constraint measure 1.6/4; administrative due-process measure 1.2/4; civil-justice independence measure 1.1/4. [7][1]
Mozambique's E1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Mozambique: Ruling-party dominance, disputed elections, postelection violence, and weak accountability sharply limit judicial and regulatory remedies.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded government safeguards against corruption 1/4 and government openness and transparency 2/4; WJP's independent-review measure 1.6/4; regulatory independence measure 1.9/4. [7][1]
Mozambique's E2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Mozambique: Ruling-party dominance, disputed elections, postelection violence, and weak accountability sharply limit judicial and regulatory remedies.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded government openness and transparency 2/4; WJP's publicized-laws measure 0.7/4; right-to-information measure 1.2/4. [7][1]
Mozambique's E3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Mozambique: Ruling-party dominance, disputed elections, postelection violence, and weak accountability sharply limit judicial and regulatory remedies.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 2/4 and due process 2/4; WJP's complaint-mechanisms measure 2.1/4; civil-justice access measure 1.8/4; civil-justice enforcement measure 1.6/4. [7][1]
Mozambique's E4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Mozambique: Ruling-party dominance, disputed elections, postelection violence, and weak accountability sharply limit judicial and regulatory remedies.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded elected officials' authority 1/4 and assembly freedom 0/4; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.6/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 3/4. [2][1][7]
Mozambique's E5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
[2][3][4]Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
[7][1]Research record
04Mozambique, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.