Highly Restricted
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Macao · 2026
Access to many global services remains available. National-security controls, concentrated media, self-censorship, surveillance powers, and weak political remedies substantially limit online freedom.
Finding
01Access to many global services remains available. National-security controls, concentrated media, self-censorship, surveillance powers, and weak political remedies substantially limit online freedom.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
11 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
Macao: Macao remains outside the mainland's full technical filtering system, but national-security enforcement and concentrated media ownership create substantial content pressure and self-censorship.; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][9][11]
Macao's B1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Macao: Macao remains outside the mainland's full technical filtering system, but national-security enforcement and concentrated media ownership create substantial content pressure and self-censorship.; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][9][11]
Macao's B2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Macao: Macao remains outside the mainland's full technical filtering system, but national-security enforcement and concentrated media ownership create substantial content pressure and self-censorship.. [2][1][9][11][3]
Macao's B3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Macao: Macao remains outside the mainland's full technical filtering system, but national-security enforcement and concentrated media ownership create substantial content pressure and self-censorship.. [2][1][9][11][3]
Macao's B4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Macao: Macao remains outside the mainland's full technical filtering system, but national-security enforcement and concentrated media ownership create substantial content pressure and self-censorship.; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][9][11]
Macao's B5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
Macao: The Basic Law formally protects expression, while the broadened national-security framework and a noncompetitive political environment materially narrow protected criticism and organizing.. [1][7][9][11]
Macao's C1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Macao: The Basic Law formally protects expression, while the broadened national-security framework and a noncompetitive political environment materially narrow protected criticism and organizing.; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][9][11]
Macao's C2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Macao: The Basic Law formally protects expression, while the broadened national-security framework and a noncompetitive political environment materially narrow protected criticism and organizing.; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][9][11]
Macao's C3 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Macao: The Basic Law formally protects expression, while the broadened national-security framework and a noncompetitive political environment materially narrow protected criticism and organizing.; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1][9][11]
Macao's C4 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Macao: The Basic Law formally protects expression, while the broadened national-security framework and a noncompetitive political environment materially narrow protected criticism and organizing.. [2][1][9][11]
Macao's C5 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Macao: Law No. 8/2005 provides access, correction, objection, and compensation rights, but the Personal Data Protection Bureau operates under the Chief Executive and national-security powers remain broad.. [6][1][10][11]
Macao's D1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Macao: Law No. 8/2005 provides access, correction, objection, and compensation rights, but the Personal Data Protection Bureau operates under the Chief Executive and national-security powers remain broad.. [1][7][10][11]
Macao's D2 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Macao: Law No. 8/2005 provides access, correction, objection, and compensation rights, but the Personal Data Protection Bureau operates under the Chief Executive and national-security powers remain broad.; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][10][11]
Macao's D3 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Macao: Law No. 8/2005 provides access, correction, objection, and compensation rights, but the Personal Data Protection Bureau operates under the Chief Executive and national-security powers remain broad.; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][10][11]
Macao's D4 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Macao: Law No. 8/2005 provides access, correction, objection, and compensation rights, but the Personal Data Protection Bureau operates under the Chief Executive and national-security powers remain broad.; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][10][11]
Macao's D5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
Macao: Courts and the data bureau provide formal procedures, but political screening, national-security institutions, and limited regulator independence weaken effective review.. [7][1][9][10][11]
Macao's E1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Macao: Courts and the data bureau provide formal procedures, but political screening, national-security institutions, and limited regulator independence weaken effective review.. [7][1][9][10][11]
Macao's E2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Macao: Courts and the data bureau provide formal procedures, but political screening, national-security institutions, and limited regulator independence weaken effective review.. [7][1][9][10][11]
Macao's E3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Macao: Courts and the data bureau provide formal procedures, but political screening, national-security institutions, and limited regulator independence weaken effective review.. [7][1][9][10][11]
Macao's E4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Macao: Courts and the data bureau provide formal procedures, but political screening, national-security institutions, and limited regulator independence weaken effective review.. [2][1][9][10][11]
Macao's E5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Jurisdiction findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
[2][3][4]Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
[7][1]Research record
04Macao Special Administrative Region, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.