Constrained
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Country assessmentResearch confidence: Medium · Evidence coverage: Standard
Jordan · 2026
Jordan
Access to global services remains available, but cybercrime enforcement, arrests over expression, surveillance authorities, and limited institutional independence constrain freedom.
Assessment windowJanuary 1–December 31, 2025
Research cutoffJuly 17, 2026
FrameworkMethodology v0.3 · 20 indicators
Territory coverageJordan
Finding
01Why Jordan received this score.
Access to global services remains available, but cybercrime enforcement, arrests over expression, surveillance authorities, and limited institutional independence constrain freedom.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Free Expression & Civic Space
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
Standard coverage
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Indicator scores.
Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
B
30% weight
Open Internet & Content Controls
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
42.512.8 / 30 points
B1Shutdowns and throttling2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Authorities blocked messaging applications during national exams and blocked 12 news outlets after critical reporting, while most other services remained accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 3/4; social-media shutdown estimate 2/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's B1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
B2Website and service blocking1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Authorities blocked messaging applications during national exams and blocked 12 news outlets after critical reporting, while most other services remained accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 3/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 2/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][2]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's B2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B3Removal and filtering orders1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Authorities blocked messaging applications during national exams and blocked 12 news outlets after critical reporting, while most other services remained accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 1/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 2/4; online-speech legal protection 1/4. [2][1][3]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's B3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B4Intermediary liability1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Authorities blocked messaging applications during national exams and blocked 12 news outlets after critical reporting, while most other services remained accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 1/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 3/4. [2][1][3]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's B4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B5Circumvention and cross-border access2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Authorities blocked messaging applications during national exams and blocked 12 news outlets after critical reporting, while most other services remained accessible.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 2/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 2/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][2]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's B5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
C
30% weight
Free Expression & Civic Space
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
37.511.3 / 30 points
C1Legal protection for expression1.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Cybercrime law is used to compel silence and punish criticism; journalist Hiba Abu Taha received one year and activist Ayman Sandouqa five years for online commentary.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 2/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 1/4; WJP's effective-expression measure 1.5/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 47/100. [1][7][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's C1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
C2Speech-related offenses1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Cybercrime law is used to compel silence and punish criticism; journalist Hiba Abu Taha received one year and activist Ayman Sandouqa five years for online commentary.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 1/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 3/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's C2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C3Arrests and penalties1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Cybercrime law is used to compel silence and punish criticism; journalist Hiba Abu Taha received one year and activist Ayman Sandouqa five years for online commentary.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 3/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 1/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's C3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C4Harassment, violence, and digital attacks1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Cybercrime law is used to compel silence and punish criticism; journalist Hiba Abu Taha received one year and activist Ayman Sandouqa five years for online commentary.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 3/5 and technical attacks 2/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 39.3/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's C4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C5Civic participation and pluralism2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Cybercrime law is used to compel silence and punish criticism; journalist Hiba Abu Taha received one year and activist Ayman Sandouqa five years for online commentary.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 3/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 2/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.3/4. [2][1][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's C5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
D
20% weight
Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
50.010.0 / 20 points
D1Data protection rights2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Journalists and activists face security surveillance and compelled undertakings, with limited disclosure of authorization, targeting, retention, or independent oversight.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 2/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 1/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 4/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 1.3/4. [6][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's D1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
D2Surveillance law and authorization1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Journalists and activists face security surveillance and compelled undertakings, with limited disclosure of authorization, targeting, retention, or independent oversight.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 2/6 and privacy protection 2/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 2/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 1.3/4. [1][7][2]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's D2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
D3Retention, access, and identity mandates2.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Journalists and activists face security surveillance and compelled undertakings, with limited disclosure of authorization, targeting, retention, or independent oversight.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 2/4 and state surveillance constraints 2/6; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 4/4; protection from political monitoring 2/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's D3 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
D4Targeted surveillance and spyware2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Journalists and activists face security surveillance and compelled undertakings, with limited disclosure of authorization, targeting, retention, or independent oversight.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 2/6 and technical attacks 2/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 2/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 39.3/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's D4 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
D5Encryption and anonymity2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Journalists and activists face security surveillance and compelled undertakings, with limited disclosure of authorization, targeting, retention, or independent oversight.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 2/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 2/4; protection from political monitoring 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's D5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
E
20% weight
Rule of Law & Accountability
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
47.59.5 / 20 points
E1Judicial independence and due process2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Formal courts and appeals remain available, but royal and executive authority, broad cybercrime enforcement, and compelled silence substantially weaken independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 2/6; WJP's judicial-constraint measure 1.9/4; administrative due-process measure 2.0/4; civil-justice independence measure 2.4/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's E1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
E2Independent regulators2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Formal courts and appeals remain available, but royal and executive authority, broad cybercrime enforcement, and compelled silence substantially weaken independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 2/6 and privacy protection 2/6; WJP's independent-review measure 2.2/4; regulatory independence measure 2.9/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's E2 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
E3Government transparency1.5 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Formal courts and appeals remain available, but royal and executive authority, broad cybercrime enforcement, and compelled silence substantially weaken independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and privacy protection 2/6; WJP's publicized-laws measure 1.4/4; right-to-information measure 1.9/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's E3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
E4Notice, appeal, and remedy2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Formal courts and appeals remain available, but royal and executive authority, broad cybercrime enforcement, and compelled silence substantially weaken independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and legal protection and judicial independence 2/6; WJP's complaint-mechanisms measure 1.6/4; civil-justice access measure 2.3/4; civil-justice enforcement measure 2.2/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's E4 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
E5Open and multistakeholder policymaking2.0 / 4
Observed record
Jordan: Formal courts and appeals remain available, but royal and executive authority, broad cybercrime enforcement, and compelled silence substantially weaken independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 3/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; WJP's civic-participation measure 1.3/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4. [2][1][7]
Scoring judgment
Jordan's E5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Country findings
03Findings by pillar.
These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Open Internet & Content Controls
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
[2][3][4]Free Expression & Civic Space
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
[2][5][8]Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Rule of Law & Accountability
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
[7][1]Research record
04Coverage
Jordan, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Evidence
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Scoring
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Sources used for this report.
Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.
- 01Freedom HouseJordan: Freedom on the Net 2025 country report ↗Civil society · 2025 edition
- 02Digital Society ProjectDigital Society Project Dataset v8 ↗Independent measurement · 2000–2025 country-year data
- 03Open Observatory of Network InterferenceJordan measurement dashboard ↗Independent measurement · Accessed July 17, 2026
- 04Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalitionInternet Shutdowns in 2025 Annual Report ↗Civil society · March 2026
- 05Committee to Protect Journalists2025 journalist prison census and case database ↗Civil society · January 21, 2026
- 06UN Trade and DevelopmentData protection and privacy legislation worldwide ↗International organization · Accessed July 17, 2026
- 07World Justice ProjectRule of Law Index 2025 ↗Independent measurement · October 28, 2025
- 08Reporters Without BordersJordan: World Press Freedom Index 2026 profile ↗Civil society · May 2026