Constrained
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Shutdowns and platform restrictions, violence against journalists and activists, surveillance, armed-group pressure, and weak remedies produce a highly restricted environment.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 3/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 3/4; social-media shutdown estimate 3/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Iraq's B1 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 4/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 3/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1]
Iraq's B2 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 1/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 3/4; online-speech legal protection 2/4. [2][1]
Iraq's B3 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 2/4. [2][1]
Iraq's B4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 3/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 3/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 3/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 3/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1]
Iraq's B5 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 2/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 41/100. [1][7]
Iraq's C1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 1/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 2/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1]
Iraq's C2 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 1/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 1/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1]
Iraq's C3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 0/5 and technical attacks 1/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 28.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Iraq's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 2/4 and digital civic mobilization 4/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 3/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 4/4. [2][1]
Iraq's C5 evidence supports 3.0/4. Protection is generally effective, with recurring but bounded shortcomings.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 3/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 0/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 3/4. [6][1]
Iraq's D1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 3/6 and privacy protection 3/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 2/4. [1][7]
Iraq's D2 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 3/4 and state surveillance constraints 3/6; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 3/4; protection from political monitoring 2/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6]
Iraq's D3 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 3/6 and technical attacks 1/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 2/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 28.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1]
Iraq's D4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Iraq: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 3/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 3/4; protection from political monitoring 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1]
Iraq's D5 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
[2][3][4]Violence, harassment, or impunity materially limits journalism and civic participation online.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
[7][1]Research record
04Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.