Highly Restricted
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Political controls, shutdown history, pressure on journalists and activists, surveillance concerns, and weak judicial checks substantially restrict online civic space.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
Eswatini: DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 2/4; social-media shutdown estimate 2/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4]
Eswatini's B1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 3/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1]
Eswatini's B2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 3/4; online-speech legal protection 2/4. [2][1]
Eswatini's B3 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 2/4. [2][1]
Eswatini's B4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 3/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 3/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1]
Eswatini's B5 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 17/100. [1][7]
Eswatini's C1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and due process 1/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 2/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1]
Eswatini's C2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded due process 1/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 1/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1]
Eswatini's C3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 51.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Eswatini's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded political choice free from domination 0/4 and assembly freedom 0/4; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 3/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 3/4. [2][1]
Eswatini's C5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Eswatini: DSP's privacy-law existence measure 1/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 4/4; Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.. [6][1]
Eswatini's D1 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 2/4 and due process 1/4; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 1/4. [1][7]
Eswatini's D2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded private discussion 1/4 and due process 1/4; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 4/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6]
Eswatini's D3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; DSP's protection from political monitoring 1/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 51.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1]
Eswatini's D4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded private discussion 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 3/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1]
Eswatini's D5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded government openness and transparency 0/4; Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.. [7][1]
Eswatini's E3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Eswatini: Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded elected officials' authority 0/4 and assembly freedom 0/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 3/4. [2][1]
Eswatini's E5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
[2][3][4]Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Oversight and remedies are weak, selective, or difficult to use against state digital powers.
[7][1]Research record
04Eswatini, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.