Highly Restricted
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Assessment windowJanuary 1–December 31, 2025
Research cutoffJuly 17, 2026
FrameworkMethodology v0.3 · 20 indicators
Territory coverageEgypt
Finding
01Why Egypt received this score.
Large-scale website blocking, prosecution of online critics, surveillance, and weak judicial remedies produce a highly restricted environment.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
Open Internet & Content Controls
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
Rule of Law & Accountability
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
Standard coverage
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Indicator scores.
Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
B
30% weight
Open Internet & Content Controls
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
42.512.8 / 30 points
B1Shutdowns and throttling2.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Authorities continue to block independent news outlets and VoIP services; the media regulator denied licenses and blocked Cairo 24 and Zawia3 during the assessment period.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 4/4; social-media shutdown estimate 3/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's B1 evidence supports 2.5/4. Meaningful safeguards coexist with material restrictions.
B2Website and service blocking1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Authorities continue to block independent news outlets and VoIP services; the media regulator denied licenses and blocked Cairo 24 and Zawia3 during the assessment period.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 1/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 1/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][2]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's B2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
B3Removal and filtering orders2.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Authorities continue to block independent news outlets and VoIP services; the media regulator denied licenses and blocked Cairo 24 and Zawia3 during the assessment period.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 1/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 3/4; online-speech legal protection 2/4. [2][1][3]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's B3 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
B4Intermediary liability1.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Authorities continue to block independent news outlets and VoIP services; the media regulator denied licenses and blocked Cairo 24 and Zawia3 during the assessment period.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 1/4. [2][1][3]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's B4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
B5Circumvention and cross-border access1.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Authorities continue to block independent news outlets and VoIP services; the media regulator denied licenses and blocked Cairo 24 and Zawia3 during the assessment period.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 4/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 3/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][2]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's B5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
C
30% weight
Free Expression & Civic Space
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
22.56.8 / 30 points
C1Legal protection for expression1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: More than 100 people were detained after social-media calls for protest, and bloggers and journalists faced prolonged detention, enforced disappearance, abuse, and torture.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; WJP's effective-expression measure 0.2/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 28/100. [1][7][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's C1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
C2Speech-related offenses1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: More than 100 people were detained after social-media calls for protest, and bloggers and journalists faced prolonged detention, enforced disappearance, abuse, and torture.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 0/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 1/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's C2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
C3Arrests and penalties0.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: More than 100 people were detained after social-media calls for protest, and bloggers and journalists faced prolonged detention, enforced disappearance, abuse, and torture.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 0/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 0/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's C3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
C4Harassment, violence, and digital attacks1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: More than 100 people were detained after social-media calls for protest, and bloggers and journalists faced prolonged detention, enforced disappearance, abuse, and torture.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 1/5 and technical attacks 2/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 24.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
C5Civic participation and pluralism1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: More than 100 people were detained after social-media calls for protest, and bloggers and journalists faced prolonged detention, enforced disappearance, abuse, and torture.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 2/4 and digital civic mobilization 2/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 1/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 1/4; WJP's civic-participation measure 0.6/4. [2][1][5][8]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's C5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
D
20% weight
Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
30.06.0 / 20 points
D1Data protection rights1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Pervasive security monitoring, device exposure, and weak independent authorization make private and anonymous political communication hazardous despite some access to encrypted tools.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 0/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 0/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 1/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 0.4/4. [6][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's D1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
D2Surveillance law and authorization1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Pervasive security monitoring, device exposure, and weak independent authorization make private and anonymous political communication hazardous despite some access to encrypted tools.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 1/6 and privacy protection 0/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 1/4; WJP's effective-privacy measure 0.4/4. [1][7][2]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's D2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
D3Retention, access, and identity mandates1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Pervasive security monitoring, device exposure, and weak independent authorization make private and anonymous political communication hazardous despite some access to encrypted tools.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4 and state surveillance constraints 1/6; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 1/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's D3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
D4Targeted surveillance and spyware1.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Pervasive security monitoring, device exposure, and weak independent authorization make private and anonymous political communication hazardous despite some access to encrypted tools.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 1/6 and technical attacks 2/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 1/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 24.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's D4 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
D5Encryption and anonymity1.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Pervasive security monitoring, device exposure, and weak independent authorization make private and anonymous political communication hazardous despite some access to encrypted tools.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's D5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
E
20% weight
Rule of Law & Accountability
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
17.53.5 / 20 points
E1Judicial independence and due process0.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Extended pretrial detention, opaque blocking, and executive influence over courts and regulators leave no dependable remedy for censorship, surveillance, or abuse in custody.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; WJP's judicial-constraint measure 1.2/4; administrative due-process measure 1.1/4; civil-justice independence measure 1.4/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's E1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
E2Independent regulators0.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Extended pretrial detention, opaque blocking, and executive influence over courts and regulators leave no dependable remedy for censorship, surveillance, or abuse in custody.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6 and privacy protection 0/6; WJP's independent-review measure 1/4; regulatory independence measure 1.8/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's E2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
E3Government transparency0.5 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Extended pretrial detention, opaque blocking, and executive influence over courts and regulators leave no dependable remedy for censorship, surveillance, or abuse in custody.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and privacy protection 0/6; WJP's publicized-laws measure 1.2/4; right-to-information measure 0.5/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's E3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
E4Notice, appeal, and remedy1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Extended pretrial detention, opaque blocking, and executive influence over courts and regulators leave no dependable remedy for censorship, surveillance, or abuse in custody.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 1/4 and legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; WJP's complaint-mechanisms measure 1.3/4; civil-justice access measure 1.9/4; civil-justice enforcement measure 1.1/4. [7][1]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's E4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
E5Open and multistakeholder policymaking1.0 / 4
Observed record
Egypt: Extended pretrial detention, opaque blocking, and executive influence over courts and regulators leave no dependable remedy for censorship, surveillance, or abuse in custody.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 2/4 and digital civic mobilization 2/6; WJP's civic-participation measure 0.6/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 1/4. [2][1][7]
Scoring judgment
Egypt's E5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Country findings
03Findings by pillar.
These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Open Internet & Content Controls
Political sites and platforms face broad or recurring blocks, and independent review is weak.
[2][3][4]Free Expression & Civic Space
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
[2][5][8]Privacy, Anonymity & User Security
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]Rule of Law & Accountability
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04Coverage
Egypt, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Evidence
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Scoring
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Sources used for this report.
Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.
- 01Freedom HouseEgypt: Freedom on the Net 2025 country report ↗Civil society · 2025 edition
- 02Digital Society ProjectDigital Society Project Dataset v8 ↗Independent measurement · 2000–2025 country-year data
- 03Open Observatory of Network InterferenceEgypt measurement dashboard ↗Independent measurement · Accessed July 17, 2026
- 04Access Now and the #KeepItOn coalitionInternet Shutdowns in 2025 Annual Report ↗Civil society · March 2026
- 05Committee to Protect Journalists2025 journalist prison census and case database ↗Civil society · January 21, 2026
- 06UN Trade and DevelopmentData protection and privacy legislation worldwide ↗International organization · Accessed July 17, 2026
- 07World Justice ProjectRule of Law Index 2025 ↗Independent measurement · October 28, 2025
- 08Reporters Without BordersEgypt: World Press Freedom Index 2026 profile ↗Civil society · May 2026