Closed
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01State control of connectivity, information, political organization, and surveillance leaves users with only narrow residual freedoms.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Centralized controls sustain nationwide filtering of political information, platforms, or circumvention tools.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Centralized controls sustain nationwide filtering of political information, platforms, or circumvention tools.
Cuba: The state telecom monopoly continued blocking independent news outlets, while poor service and the 2025 mobile-data price increase further limited practical access to outside information.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 3/6; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 2/4; social-media shutdown estimate 2/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Cuba's B1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Cuba: The state telecom monopoly continued blocking independent news outlets, while poor service and the 2025 mobile-data price increase further limited practical access to outside information.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content blocking 3/6; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 1/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][2]
Cuba's B2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Cuba: The state telecom monopoly continued blocking independent news outlets, while poor service and the 2025 mobile-data price increase further limited practical access to outside information.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded content-removal pressure 1/4 and transparency and appeal safeguards 0/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 3/4; online-speech legal protection 0/4. [2][1][3]
Cuba's B3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Cuba: The state telecom monopoly continued blocking independent news outlets, while poor service and the 2025 mobile-data price increase further limited practical access to outside information.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 0/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 0/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 0/4. [2][1][3]
Cuba's B4 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: The state telecom monopoly continued blocking independent news outlets, while poor service and the 2025 mobile-data price increase further limited practical access to outside information.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state control over connectivity 3/6 and anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][2]
Cuba's B5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
Cuba: Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz received five years in prison for a Facebook post, and José Manuel Barreiro Rouco received two and a half years for memes shared in a private WhatsApp group.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 0/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 21/100. [1][7][5][8]
Cuba's C1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz received five years in prison for a Facebook post, and José Manuel Barreiro Rouco received two and a half years for memes shared in a private WhatsApp group.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online-speech liability 0/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 0/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Cuba's C2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz received five years in prison for a Facebook post, and José Manuel Barreiro Rouco received two and a half years for memes shared in a private WhatsApp group.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded penalties for online activity 1/6; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 0/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Cuba's C3 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz received five years in prison for a Facebook post, and José Manuel Barreiro Rouco received two and a half years for memes shared in a private WhatsApp group.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded violence and intimidation 2/5 and technical attacks 1/3; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 29.2/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Cuba's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Cuba: Félix Daniel Pérez Ruiz received five years in prison for a Facebook post, and José Manuel Barreiro Rouco received two and a half years for memes shared in a private WhatsApp group.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 1/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 0/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4. [2][1][5][8]
Cuba's C5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Identity, retention, localization, or lawful-access mandates materially restrict anonymous communication.
Cuba: The government announced online-content inspectors under the Social Communication Law, and state control of connectivity leaves private and anonymous political communication exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded privacy protection 0/6; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 0/1. [6][1][2]
Cuba's D1 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Cuba: The government announced online-content inspectors under the Social Communication Law, and state control of connectivity leaves private and anonymous political communication exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 1/6 and privacy protection 0/6; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 2/4. [1][7][2][6]
Cuba's D2 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Cuba: The government announced online-content inspectors under the Social Communication Law, and state control of connectivity leaves private and anonymous political communication exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4 and state surveillance constraints 1/6; protection from political monitoring 2/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2]
Cuba's D3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Cuba: The government announced online-content inspectors under the Social Communication Law, and state control of connectivity leaves private and anonymous political communication exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded state surveillance constraints 1/6 and technical attacks 1/3; DSP's protection from political monitoring 2/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 29.2/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][6]
Cuba's D4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Cuba: The government announced online-content inspectors under the Social Communication Law, and state control of connectivity leaves private and anonymous political communication exposed.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded anonymous and encrypted communication 1/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 1/4; protection from political monitoring 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][6]
Cuba's D5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
Cuba: Courts, regulators, and the telecom operator do not provide an independent route to challenge political blocking, monitoring, or imprisonment for online dissent.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6. [7][1][2]
Cuba's E1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Courts, regulators, and the telecom operator do not provide an independent route to challenge political blocking, monitoring, or imprisonment for online dissent.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded legal protection and judicial independence 0/6 and privacy protection 0/6. [7][1][2]
Cuba's E2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Courts, regulators, and the telecom operator do not provide an independent route to challenge political blocking, monitoring, or imprisonment for online dissent.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 0/4 and privacy protection 0/6. [7][1][2]
Cuba's E3 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Courts, regulators, and the telecom operator do not provide an independent route to challenge political blocking, monitoring, or imprisonment for online dissent.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded transparency and appeal safeguards 0/4 and legal protection and judicial independence 0/6. [7][1][2]
Cuba's E4 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Cuba: Courts, regulators, and the telecom operator do not provide an independent route to challenge political blocking, monitoring, or imprisonment for online dissent.; Freedom House's 2025 country scorecard recorded online information diversity 1/4 and digital civic mobilization 3/6; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4. [2][1]
Cuba's E5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Centralized controls sustain nationwide filtering of political information, platforms, or circumvention tools.
[2][3][4]Independent political expression and civic organizing face systematic state repression.
[2][5][8]Identity, retention, localization, or lawful-access mandates materially restrict anonymous communication.
[6][1]No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04Cuba, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.