Highly Restricted
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Finding
01Political shutdowns, restrictions on independent reporting, detention and intimidation, surveillance concerns, and weak remedies produce a closed online environment.
The score draws on country reporting, network measurements, shutdown records, journalist cases, privacy law, and rule-of-law data. The indicator findings below show how that evidence was converted into points. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8]
This is the weighted total of the four scored pillars.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
8 cited sources support this assessment.
Scored assessment
02Each indicator receives 0–4 points. Five indicators form a pillar. The pillar average is converted to a percentage and multiplied by its published weight.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
Chad: Authorities retain a record of shutdowns and platform restrictions around political crises, while ordinary access remains partly available outside those periods.; DSP's 2025 shutdown-practice estimate 2/4; social-media shutdown estimate 2/4; OONI measurements and the Access Now shutdown record provide the incident check. [2][3][4][1]
Chad's B1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Chad: Authorities retain a record of shutdowns and platform restrictions around political crises, while ordinary access remains partly available outside those periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's 2025 political-filtering estimate 2/4; the country OONI dashboard supplies direct network measurements. [3][1][4]
Chad's B2 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Chad: Authorities retain a record of shutdowns and platform restrictions around political crises, while ordinary access remains partly available outside those periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's 2025 political-content censorship estimate 2/4; online-speech legal protection 2/4. [2][1][3][4]
Chad's B3 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Chad: Authorities retain a record of shutdowns and platform restrictions around political crises, while ordinary access remains partly available outside those periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; protection against legal abuse by political elites 2/4. [2][1][3][4]
Chad's B4 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Chad: Authorities retain a record of shutdowns and platform restrictions around political crises, while ordinary access remains partly available outside those periods.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 2/4; independence from state-controlled social platforms 2/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the circumvention check. [3][1][4]
Chad's B5 evidence supports 2.0/4. Restrictions are recurrent and safeguards are only partly effective.
Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
Chad: Opposition and civic activists face violence, imprisonment, torture, and intimidation under a government consolidated through flawed elections after military succession.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and private discussion 2/4; DSP's online-speech legal protection estimate 2/4; the relevant Freedom House country score 15/100. [1][7][5][8]
Chad's C1 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Chad: Opposition and civic activists face violence, imprisonment, torture, and intimidation under a government consolidated through flawed elections after military succession.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and due process 1/4; DSP's protection against abuse of defamation and copyright law 2/4; Freedom House country reporting supplies the offense and enforcement record. [2][1][5][8]
Chad's C2 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Chad: Opposition and civic activists face violence, imprisonment, torture, and intimidation under a government consolidated through flawed elections after military succession.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded due process 1/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; DSP's 2025 political-arrest estimate 0/3; CPJ and Freedom House records provide the documented case check. [2][5][1][8]
Chad's C3 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Chad: Opposition and civic activists face violence, imprisonment, torture, and intimidation under a government consolidated through flawed elections after military succession.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; the 2026 RSF press-freedom score 53.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the violence, harassment, and accountability record. [5][8][1]
Chad's C4 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Chad: Opposition and civic activists face violence, imprisonment, torture, and intimidation under a government consolidated through flawed elections after military succession.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded political choice free from domination 0/4 and assembly freedom 1/4; DSP's online-media pluralism estimate 2/4; ordinary people's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4. [2][1][5][8]
Chad's C5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
Chad: Security monitoring, device exposure, conflict, and weak data safeguards leave political communications vulnerable with little transparent authorization.; DSP's privacy-law existence measure 1/1; privacy-law constraint on government access 3/4. [6][1][2][7]
Chad's D1 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Chad: Security monitoring, device exposure, conflict, and weak data safeguards leave political communications vulnerable with little transparent authorization.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 0/4 and due process 1/4; DSP's protection from political social-media monitoring 1/4. [1][7][2]
Chad's D2 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Chad: Security monitoring, device exposure, conflict, and weak data safeguards leave political communications vulnerable with little transparent authorization.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded private discussion 2/4 and due process 1/4; DSP's privacy-law constraint on government access 3/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; UNCTAD and Freedom House records provide the retention and identity-law check. [1][6][2][7]
Chad's D3 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Chad: Security monitoring, device exposure, conflict, and weak data safeguards leave political communications vulnerable with little transparent authorization.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded media freedom 1/4 and equal treatment under law 0/4; DSP's protection from political monitoring 1/4; the RSF press-freedom environment 53.9/100; CPJ and Freedom House reporting provide the targeted-surveillance case record. [5][1][2][7]
Chad's D4 evidence supports 0.5/4. Only narrow residual protection remains.
Chad: Security monitoring, device exposure, conflict, and weak data safeguards leave political communications vulnerable with little transparent authorization.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded private discussion 2/4; DSP's political-filtering estimate 2/4; protection from political monitoring 1/4; OONI and Freedom House records provide the encryption and anonymity check. [3][1][2][7]
Chad's D5 evidence supports 1.5/4. Restrictions are widespread, although limited protection remains.
No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
Chad: Military succession, undemocratic elections, executive dominance, and security-force abuse leave almost no effective independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 0/4 and due process 1/4. [7][1]
Chad's E1 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Chad: Military succession, undemocratic elections, executive dominance, and security-force abuse leave almost no effective independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded government safeguards against corruption 0/4 and government openness and transparency 0/4. [7][1]
Chad's E2 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Chad: Military succession, undemocratic elections, executive dominance, and security-force abuse leave almost no effective independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded government openness and transparency 0/4. [7][1]
Chad's E3 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Chad: Military succession, undemocratic elections, executive dominance, and security-force abuse leave almost no effective independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded judicial independence 0/4 and due process 1/4. [7][1]
Chad's E4 evidence supports 0.0/4. The record matches the zero-point anchor.
Chad: Military succession, undemocratic elections, executive dominance, and security-force abuse leave almost no effective independent remedy.; Freedom House's 2026 country scorecard recorded elected officials' authority 0/4 and assembly freedom 1/4; DSP's online civic-mobilization estimate 2/4. [2][1][7]
Chad's E5 evidence supports 1.0/4. The right is severely restricted and effective safeguards are weak.
Country findings
03These are the principal findings for each scored part of the report. The indicator records above provide the supporting detail.
Shutdowns, throttling, or platform restrictions have been used during protests, elections, conflict, or unrest.
[2][3][4]Authorities use criminal cases, detention, or severe penalties against online expression and organizing.
[2][5][8]Broad surveillance powers and limited independent authorization weaken privacy and anonymity.
[6][1]No dependable independent remedy constrains political censorship or surveillance in practice.
[7][1]Research record
04Chad, assessed from January 1 through December 31, 2025.
Network measurements, legal and institutional datasets, shutdown records, and documented cases support the findings.
Twenty indicators measure content openness, expression, privacy, security, and institutional checks under Methodology v0.3.
Source register
05Country reporting, open measurements, and cross-national datasets form the report record.